Scholars acknowledge last-minute diplomacy, but criticize Iraq policy

BY ANDREA M. HAMILTON

A Nov. 13 panel titled "Iraq: War or Diplomacy" might well have been dubbed "war and diplomacy." Hosted by Stanford Law School and the Institute for International Studies and moderated by Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan, the panel featured four Stanford scholars representing a broad range of disciplines and perspectives. Though no one on the panel was a defender, let alone admirer, of the Bush administration's approach to Iraq, they all acknowledged its belated efforts to win the backing of allies, the United Nations and Congress. That said, they found much to be desired in the current confrontational environment.

History Professor Ahmad Dallal, left, and Law Professor John Barton took a critical look at Bush administration policies and actions toward Iraq and the likelihood of conflict at a Nov. 13 panel discussion. Photo: Rod Searcey

Law Professor John Barton worried that Iraq's history of conflict with U.N. weapons inspectors bodes ill for the prospects of a coming military crisis. "Iraq has a history of difficulty with inspectors. You can be sure there will be a set of crises later on when Iraq complicates the lives of the inspectors."

Islamic studies specialist Ahmad Dallal, associate professor of history, was bluntly critical of the U.S. approach to the Middle East, particularly as seen by those in the region. He cited several problematic issues for the United States in dealing with the region, including Washington's history of "striking deals with dictators" and its tendency to conflate Israel's war with the Palestinians with the larger U.S. war on terrorism. "Most Arabs are opposed to this; they see it as a double standard," he said, noting that Israel is in violation of many U.N. resolutions.

While he said he believes that Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons, Dallal noted that many of its neighbors think Baghdad is incapable of launching an expansive attack. "Few people would refute that Saddam Hussein is a brutal despot"; however, "with all this talk about regime change, many in the region are concerned about stability." Dallal said he fears the consequences of an invasion of Iraq -- which include the possibility that, out of desperation, Saddam Hussein might use weapons of mass destruction.

Dallal also pointed to "well-founded fears of instability in the post- Saddam vacuum" and lambasted the Bush administration's lack of any realistic political vision for a postwar Iraq. "There are no plans for dealing with the aftermath of an invasion. No one is thinking about the required foundations for a post-Saddam regime." Lastly, there are concerns about the high costs, both in dollars and lives lost, from an invasion. "The region would pay the highest price for war," Dallal said.

President Emeritus Gerhard Casper focused his remarks on the Sept. 17 "National Security Strategy of the United States" document issued by the Bush administration. In a parliamentary system, Casper noted, one would consider such a document to be a formation of official government policy. However, in a republic like the United States, with separate branches of government and checks and balances, a "national strategy" normally would be submitted by the executive as a draft and then approved by Congress. This document was not. "Instead, it is primarily a statement of how the Bush administration sees the global balance of power and what needs to be done." He noted dryly that in the 34-page document, Congress was mentioned only once and the United Nations twice.

Viewing the current situation as "more complex and dangerous than mutual assured destruction during the Cold War period," Casper acknowledged that the Bush administration had "so far done it right," by eventually going to Congress and to the U.N. Security Council for approval. "Not many post-World War II administrations have been so circumspect," he noted. That said, the so-called strategy document depicts the executive branch's readiness to act on its own, and even preemptively if necessary -- which Casper called a major change in policy receiving little public discussion. "Under the Constitution, the primary responsibility for going to war lies with Congress, which must make the appropriations," Casper reminded the audience. "The president has always had the power to repel sudden attacks without going to Congress," he added.

Casper said he would have preferred if the administration referred to such preemptive actions as a last resort. Notwithstanding the emphasis on organizing coalitions as broad as possible and the repeated assertions of humility, "this is everything but humble," he concluded.

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, a senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and senior adviser to the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, argued that diplomacy is most effective if backed up by the real threat of force. "It should be our strong preference to threaten, but stop short of, absolute force." She emphasized the possibility that nuclear and biological weapons could fall into the wrong hands is a real concern. And while Randall agreed that addressing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is important, in her eyes "it is not a first priority."

Randall, an assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, noted a major transformation late this summer in the administration's strategy toward coalition building, after pressure from key U.S. allies not to "go it alone." She attributed the shift to the administration's belated realization of the need to engage a broader range of countries, including China and Russia, as well as to get Congress on board. "The Bush administration finally decided to build a coalition instead of go it alone," she said. Randall applauded the move and warned that in the event diplomacy fails to disarm Iraq, "we will need our allies to go to war."

Likewise, in the aftermath of an invasion, the United States will need help in post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. And it also must take account of the other countries in the region that will be affected by war. "Pursuing diplomacy first is essential. It shows the U.S. at its best," Randall said. "Iraq is not the highest threat we face."

Asked to consider what motives they saw behind U.S. policy, specifically if the U.S. desire to go to war was driven by oil, the panelists diverged. Casper and Randall were skeptical of the oil argument because the United States will get oil anyway, even if it just has to pay more for it. Dallal disagreed, seeing oil as one of many factors that also include the perception that Saddam Hussein is a threat to U.S. security as well as the notion that Bush needs to complete his father's unfinished business.