Lederberg: Moral
suasion best defense against biological weapons
BY ELLEN LICKING
Nations must adopt a
stronger moral stance against the development of
biological weapons because treaties alone are not enough
to stop their use, said Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg
in a public address at Stanford University on Jan. 12.
"The cold reality is
that it is almost impossible to enforce the existing
biological weapons treaty. There is no biological weapons
facility,which if shut down today could not be rebuilt
tomorrow," he said.
As of 1995, 17 countries
were suspected of developing biological weapons for
offensive purposes. Under heavy diplomatic and military
pressure, Russia and Iraq have admitted to past
transgressions. The United Nations Security Council is
currently investigating Iraqi sites for potential
biological weapons, Lederberg said.
In the third annual Albert
and Cicely Wheelon Lecture, sponsored by the Center for
International Security and Arms Control (CISAC),
Lederberg tackled the subject of germ warfare and the
enforcement of the 25-year-old treaty that bans it.
Lederberg, whose expertise spans issues ranging from
bacterial genetics to national security, has served on
CISAC's executive committee and has co-chaired the
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and
Government. Formerly chair of genetics at Stanford, he is
currently president emeritus at Rockefeller University.
Because of their potential
to wreak havoc on both civilians and soldiers, germs are
a nightmare weapon. Diseases can be introduced
deliberately via infectious bacteria or viruses during
military conflict. Bacteria like Bacillus anthracis,
which produces the anthrax toxin, are highly infectious
and deadly. Under ideal conditions, just 200 pounds of
anthax spores can have the same killing power as a
nuclear bomb.
In order to limit the
development of biological weapons technology, more than
100 nations, including the United States, the former
Soviet Union, and Iraq, signed the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention treaty and declared germ weaponry
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind." This
document, which provides the legal framework for the
global regulation of biological weapons, condemns the
development, production or stockpiling of microbial
agents or toxins that are not justified as having
prophylactic or protective purposes.
According to Lederberg,
the language of the treaty is problematic. Almost any
agent that could be used for biological warfare also has
important peaceful and medical uses. "There are very
good reasons for growing anthrax, including vaccine
development and protection against the disease,"
said Lederberg. Because this technology has both medical
and military applications, it is almost impossible to
provide evidence of a formal violation of the treaty's
terms. "Anything short of actual weaponization, such
as putting a live virus at the end of a bomb or artillery
shell, can be legitimized," Lederberg said.
In addition, the
technology needed to develop a vaccine is not much
different from that needed to make a biological weapon.
Some vaccines are created from material isolated from
dead bacterial or viral cells. Keep the germs alive, and
the potential for a biological weapon exists. Overnight,
a nation could shift its research from vaccines to
biological weapons.
Another concern is the
limited infrastructure required for bio-weapons
development. With no more than a beer fermenter and a
starting bacterial culture, it is possible to grow
trillions of bacteria in a matter of days. "Even if
the U.N. security forces shut down Saddam Hussein's
biological weapons program, it wouldn't be difficult for
him to move his operations elsewhere and begin
again," Lederberg said.
As the 20th century draws
to a close, an unpleasant paradox has emerged. Although
the 1972 treaty ended open stockpiling of biological
weapons, it has resulted in covert programs in countries
that choose to ignore the international law. Of
particular concern is potential use of biological weapons
by terrorist organizations. "For a small power,
biological weapons are the answer to a prayer,
potentially allowing them to cut a deal with a
superpower," said Lederberg.
To prevent the resurgence
of biological weapons development, Lederberg believes an
international consensus is necessary. "There must be
a moral mobilization among the nations to enforce the
treaty if it is violated. We need to share the conviction
that biological weapons are dangerous and should not be
developed," he said.
Ultimately, because the
technology can be converted easily from peaceful to
military uses, it comes down to a question of intent. Why
Iraq cultivates anthrax or botulism is a secret. Whether
it would use them in a hostile encounter is also a
mystery. But one thing is certain: According to
Lederberg, our knowledge of the use of microbes is a
double-edged sword. "Our knowledge of microbes can
be used for good or for evil," he said. "In
that knowledge we have the seeds with which to sow our
own destruction." SR
Ellen Licking is a
science writing intern at Stanford News Service.
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